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Roads of War: 
Paved Highways and the Rise of IED Attacks in Afghanistan 
 
Abstract  
Paved roads have been widely heralded by members of the policymaking world as 
a useful tool in combating the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in 
Afghanistan. With the number of IED attacks growing exponentially since 2006, 
government officials have made the case for greater funding for road construction by 
explicitly linking paved roads with improved security conditions. This thesis subjects that 
connection to greater scrutiny and gives voice to the few detractors who contend that 
paved roads make security conditions worse. Moreover, this thesis examines new data on 
IED attacks along roads in Afghanistan and concludes that paving has no meaningful 
effect on the frequency of IED incidents, suggesting that policymakers should reassess 
the value of road construction projects and the reasoning used to sell those projects. 
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I. Introduction 
“Improvised explosive devices, usually made of fertilizer, are the Afghan 
insurgents' great force equalizer” 
-Yaroslav Torfimov 
Foreign Correspondent, Wall Street Journal 
 I remember the precise day the idea behind this thesis first came to me. It was 
December 28, 2009 — the day I began reading David Kilcullen’s The Accidental 
Guerrilla. The Afghan war was an intriguing topic to me, and I believed the writing of a 
counterinsurgency expert would shed some light on the topic. It was his book that first 
introduced me to the argument that paving roads reduces the number of IED attacks in 
Afghanistan. The material also came in the shadow of a major policy address on 
Afghanistan earlier that month by President Barack Obama. His speech touched upon a 
variety of different points, but one quote in particular summarized his decision: “as 
Commander-in-Chief, I have determined that it is in our vital national interest to send an 
additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan. After 18 months, our troops will begin to 
come home.”1 After listening to the President’s new strategy and after several days of 
reading and note taking on Kilcullen’s book I asked myself, “are paved roads really a key 
solution for something as complex as IED attacks in Afghanistan, and if so, how should 
this new revelation change US strategy?” 
  I have spent much of my time since then asking myself that question, and for me 
the answer has changed twice. The elegance and simplicity behind Kilcullen’s logic that 
paved roads reduce IED attacks is compelling, and it wasn’t until a year later that I began 
to doubt the claims of the former Australian army Lieutenant Colonel. Arguments made 
                                                
1 Obama, Barack, “The New Way Forward” (speech presented at West Point to address 
changes in US strategy in Afghanistan, New York, December 1, 2009). 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2009/12/01/new-way-forward-presidents-address> 
(April 7, 2011) 
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by intellectuals like Joshua Foust, field researchers like Brian Glyn Williams and scholars 
like John O’Loughlin all placed enough doubt in my mind that I began to believe the 
opposite — that paving roads increases IED attacks.2 It wasn’t late in the process that my 
mind changed a second time. After examining new data on IED attacks along roads in 
Afghanistan, I concluded that paving roads has no meaningful impact on the frequency of 
IED attacks, positive or negative. 
 
Structure 
I divide my analysis of IEDs among four sections. I begin by tracing how IED 
attacks arrived in Afghanistan, starting with how the war has changed since 2001. 
Second, I define and assess the impact of IEDs and IED countermeasures in Afghanistan, 
including how policymakers, field researchers and civil war and insurgency theorists 
describe the impacts of road construction projects on IED attacks. Third, I test these 
assessments of road projects against military data on IEDs from Afghanistan, using two 
separate roads from eastern and southern Afghanistan as case studies. In the conclusion, I 
offer some practical suggestions for policymakers based on the findings in the third 
section. 
 
Sources of Information 
This thesis draws extensively from three sources of information: field research 
from Afghanistan conducted between the start of 2007 and 2009 by Brian Glyn Williams, 
                                                
2 Joshua Foust is fellow at the American Security Project; Brian Glyn Willaims is an 
Associate Professor of Islamic History at the University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth; 
and a John O’Loughlin is a Professor of Geography at the University of Colorado-
Boulder. 
8 
Carter Malkasian and Gerald Meyerle; government documents from the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID), the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO); and geographic data on IEDs between 2004 
and 2009 — known more commonly in the press as the “Afghan war logs”3 — leaked by 
the website WikiLeaks on July 25, 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
3 Alexandra Topping and Jo Adetunji, “Afghanistan War Logs: Wikileaks Founder 
Rebuts White House Criticism,” The Guardian, July 26, 2006, 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/26/war-logs-wikileaks-rebuts-criticism> 
(April 7, 2011). 
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II. The Arrival of IEDs 
Background 
Aside from the merits of the decision to send additional troops to Afghanistan, the 
mere fact a surge was deemed necessary to turn the tide of the war is emblematic of how 
much the nature of the war has changed since 2001. Commonly described the “Forgotten 
War,” the Afghan war has not been a consistent battle between Taliban insurgents and 
US and coalition forces.4 In the first years following the invasion, the United States was 
enormously successful in Afghanistan. The initial invasion lasted less than two months, 
as Taliban resistance collapsed almost immediately. During the first four years following 
the collapse of the Taliban, US forces faced relatively low levels of insurgent violence, 
and US operations were primarily geared at eliminating Taliban remnants in the country.5 
With superior firepower, particularly the use of tactical aircraft armed with state-of-the-
art weaponry, the United States held a consistent advantage against Taliban forces using 
traditional guerilla warfare tactics. By late 2005, military commanders believed that their 
operations, combined with added political and economic reconstruction, had essentially 
ended the insurgency.6 
                                                
4 Major news outlets have repeatedly used this terminology to describe the war in 
Afghanistan. For examples see Charles M. Sennott, “Afghanistan: After 5 years, a 
forgotten war?,” New York Times, September 12, 2006, 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/12/world/asia/12iht-afghan.2785628.html> (April 7, 
2011); Carlotta Gall, “Despite Years of U.S. Pressure, Taliban Fight on in Jagged Hills,” 
New York Times, June 4, 2005, 
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A03E7D71438F937A35755C0A9639
C8B63> (April 7, 2011). 
5 U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Afghanistan: Post-War 
Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy by Kenneth Katzman (Washington, DC: 
November 26, 2008), 23. 
6 Kenneth Katzman, 23. 
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They were wrong. As Lieutenant General David Barno, the US and coalition 
commander in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005, explained, “since 2006 the Taliban and 
[Al-Qaeda have] gathered strength, changed tactics, and increased their capabilities and 
attacks.“7 Like the Stinger missiles the US supplied to the mujahideen in Afghanistan in 
the 1980s, Taliban insurgents needed an equalizer — something to help level the playing 
field. The Taliban found that equalizer in a tactic that has heavily shaped the nature of the 
Afghan war since 2006: improvised explosive devices (IEDs).  
 
The Iraq Connection 
Based on his field research during the spring of 2007, Brian Glyn Williams argues 
that Afghanistan experienced an “Iraq effect,” or the transfer of terrorist tactics from Iraq 
to Afghanistan, beginning in the summer of 2006. The US widely suspected that many of 
Al-Qaeda’s emissaries from Iraq were crossing between the two theatres as early as 2003, 
sharing information on tactics and encouraging Taliban and Taliban-affiliated groups to 
replace their strategy of traditional guerrilla warfare with IED and suicide operations.8 In 
a demonstration of the law unintended consequences, Williams explains that those 
insurgents initially opposed to changing tactics were convinced to adopt them after 
                                                
7 Valentina Taddeo, “US Response to Terrorism: A Strategic Analysis of the Afghanistan 
Campaign.” Journal of Strategic Security 3, no. 2 (Summer 2010): 29-31, 
<http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol3/iss2/3/> (April 7, 2011). 
8 Brian Glyn Williams, “Mullah Omar’s Missiles. A Field Report on Suicide Bombers in 
Afghanistan,” Middle East Policy 15, no. 4 (Winter 2008): 31, 
<http://www.brianglynwilliams.com/publications.html> (April 7, 2011). 
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watching DVDs of successful IED and suicide attacks on US forces in Iraq.9 These 
DVDs were widely available in the tribal regions of Pakistan by the summer of 2004. 
Taliban leaders have also admitted to having regular interaction with members of the 
Iraqi insurgency. Mullah Dadullah, a former senior Taliban military commander, explains 
in an interview quoted by Williams that Afghan insurgents learned the bombings they 
carry out from Iraqi insurgents, adding that the Taliban regularly sends individuals to Iraq 
to learn “more effective killing techniques.”10 After a year of testing the impact of IED 
and suicide attacks the Taliban began to regularly deploy both tactics in 2006. Observers 
began to notice the change, explaining that the Afghan insurgents appeared to have 
learned the techniques from Iraqi insurgents.11 As the Afghan National Directorate of 
Security bluntly put it in 2007, “Had the Americans not invaded Iraq and created a jihadi 
training ground there, we would never have had these bombers here. This all comes to us 
as a result of America’s war against (Saddam) Hussein.”12 
 
 
 
                                                
9 The rise of suicide bombing in Afghanistan, although not the focus of this thesis, could 
serve as a useful case study confirming and challenging existing notions of the 
motivations behind suicide bombing. The strategic application of suicide bombing in 
Afghanistan lends credence to Robert Pape’s central claim that there is a strategic logic 
behind suicide terrorism. See Robert Pape, “Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of 
Suicide Terrorism,” Australian Army Journal 3, no. 3 (Summer 2006) and Assaf 
Moghadam, “Motives for Martyrdom,” International Security 33, no. 3 (Winter 2008-
2009) for additional literature on suicide terrorism. 
10 Williams, 34. 
11 Peter Bergen, “The Taliban, Regrouped and Rearmed,” The Washington Post, 
September 10, 2006, < http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/09/08/AR2006090801614.html> (April 7, 2011). 
12 Williams, 32. 
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III. Addressing IEDs: Roads and The Search for Solutions 
Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) arrived in Afghanistan under similar 
circumstances as suicide bombings, but while suicide attacks have remained limited to a 
few hundred incidents per year, the frequency of IED attacks has risen far more 
dramatically. Since 2005, these devices have continued to produce devastating results 
against NATO and US forces and civilians, and today, IEDs are one of the key tactical 
weapons used by the Taliban and other Afghan insurgent groups. The US military defines 
an IED as: 
A device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating 
destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and 
designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. It may incorporate 
military stores, but is normally devised from nonmilitary components.13 
In principle any explosive weapon not constructed on a production line may be 
classified as an IED. This definition would include not only roadside bombs but also car 
bombs, shape charge IEDs and suicide bombs.14 However, given the physical differences 
between a so-called “smart” suicide bomb and other improvised explosive devices, this 
thesis is limited to exploring the only the latter tactic. 
In response to the rise of this tactic in Iraq and Afghanistan, the office of the 
Army Chief of Staff established the Army IED Task Force in October 2003, tasked with 
coordinating the efforts of other government agencies, the private sector, academics and 
other organizations to develop new methods and technologies to counter IEDs. The task 
                                                
13 U.S. Department of Defense, The Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint 
Publication 1-02), 177. 
14 Carlo Kopp, “Technology of Improvised Explosive Devices,” Defence Today, 46, 
<www.ausairpower.net/DT-IED-1007.pdf> (April 7, 2011). 
13 
force was made permanent in February 2006 and was renamed the Joint IED Defeat 
Organization (JIEDDO). However, despite the organization’s efforts IED attacks are 
more frequent and as deadly as ever. JIEDDO itself explained in its FY 2009 Annual 
Report that the number of IED incidents in Afghanistan nearly doubled from FY 2008 
and the number of casualties caused by IEDs increased 39 percent.15 In short, the United 
States has not yet developed a strategy or technology that has significantly decreased 
these numbers. 
 
Uniqueness of Afghanistan IEDs 
“We are essentially attempting to find a fertilizer-based bomb, so it has very low 
or no metallic content, and it is [typically] buried [in the dirt on] an unimproved road.” 
This explanation by the Director of JIEDDO — Lieutenant General Michael L. Oates — 
is the most basic and accurate characterization of the types of IEDs the US military faces 
in Afghanistan. The overwhelming majority of IED attacks are ammonium nitrate-based 
explosives triggered by a pressure plate.16 A chemical compound commonly found in 
high-nitrogen fertilizer, ammonium nitrate was the explosive used in 80 to 90 percent of 
Afghan IEDs between 2007 and 2009.17 These devices are different from many in Iraq, 
                                                
15 U.S. Department of Defense. Joint IED Defeat Organization. Annual Report FY 2009. 
(Washington, DC: 2009).  
16 Michael L. Oates, “US Government Efforts to Counter IEDs,” Foreign Press Center, 
Washington, DC: December 3, 2010. 
<https://www.jieddo.dod.mil/content/docs/20101206_FPC_LTG_Oates_on%2520_EDs.
pdf> (April 7, 2011). 
17 Michael Flynn, “State of the Insurgency: Trends, Intentions, and Objectives” 
(PowerPoint slides, December 22, 2009), 9-11. 
14 
where a significant number of military-grade munitions leftover from Saddam Hussein’s 
regime are used as IEDs.18 
However, the reality that the overwhelming majority of attacks are comprised of 
homemade explosives should not imply that IEDs in Afghanistan are unvaried or 
unsophisticated. Ammonium nitrate-based fertilizer bombs are the most common, but the 
Haqqani network, an insurgent group closely allied with the Taliban located principally 
in eastern Afghanistan, prefers to use potassium chlorate explosives. Roadside bombs are 
also often supplemented with additional tactics, including small unit ambushes when first 
responders arrive on the scene and the use of conventional weapons.19 Afghan insurgents 
have increasingly used even more powerful IEDs, explosively formed projectiles (EFPs) 
— made from pipes filled with explosives — that are commonly used in Iraq. These 
devices strike with enough power to penetrate heavy armor, producing more heavy 
casualties than traditional IEDs.20 
 
Impact of IED Attacks 
 Given the death tolls caused by IEDs, finding a technology or method to combat 
these devices is one of the most important priorities for the US military. By every 
measure IED attacks cause more deaths than any other tactic utilized by the Afghan 
insurgency. For NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), roadside bombs 
                                                
18 Oates, Foreign Press Center, December 6, 2010. 
19 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Improvised Explosive 
Devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan: Effects and Countermeasures by Clay Wilson 
(Washington, DC: August 28, 2007), 3. 
20 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Improvised Explosive 
Devices (IEDs) in Iraq: Effects and Countermeasures by Clay Wilson (Washington, DC: 
February 10, 2006), 3. 
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were responsible for the majority of the deaths of coalition forces, totaling an estimated 
60 percent in 2009.21 The Department of Defense estimates that while suicide bombs 
were responsible for less than two percent of US troops deaths since the start of the war, 
IED attacks were responsible for a plurality — 40.8 percent — of US troop deaths, 
despite the fact that IEDs were not widely used in Afghanistan prior to 2006. IEDs were 
also responsible for a majority of US troop deaths in two of the last three years.22 
Although Taliban insurgent attacks are primarily targeted toward government or military 
forces they are often carried out in areas frequented by civilians, often resulting in an 
even larger number of civilian casualties.23 Of all the casualties from IED attacks, about 
two-thirds are Afghan.24 Of the 1,630 civilian deaths reportedly caused by the insurgency 
in 2009, 47 percent were due to IED attacks.25  
These attacks have also inhibited the military’s efforts to win over the local 
population — a necessary step in a successful counterinsurgency operation. Mullah 
Mohammed Omar, the spiritual leader of the Taliban insurgency, published a new code 
of conduct for insurgents in 2009 in an attempt to win local support for the Taliban. 
Among its 13 chapters and 67 articles, the book prohibits certain types of behavior, 
including taking children for jihad, avoiding the deaths of locals while conducting suicide 
                                                
21 “Roadside Bombs Surge in Afghanistan,” Associated Press, June 4, 2009, 
<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31111482/ns/world_news-south_and_central_asia> 
(April 7, 2011). 
22 Ian S. Livingston et al, Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & 
Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan, Brookings Institution, February 28, 2011, 11. 
23 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Afghanistan: Annual 
Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 2009, Kabul: January 2010, 5. 
24 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint IED Defeat Organization, JIEDDO Fact Sheet, 
August 2010 
<https://www.jieddo.dod.mil/content/docs/20100804_JIEDDO_Fact_Sheet.pdf> (April, 
2011). 
25 UNAMA (January 2010), 15. 
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bombings and eliminating forced donations from the population.26 Despite these alleged 
changes, multiple human rights organizations note that IED attacks are still used by the 
Taliban to spread fear and to intimidate the local population, while other insurgent groups 
like the Haqqani network in eastern Afghanistan are even less willing to discriminate 
between their targets, attacking civilians and coalition forces in equal numbers.27 Locals 
commonly report feeling trapped between the fear of being attacked by insurgents if they 
do cooperate and being attacked by US forces if they do not.28 
 
Existing Countermeasures  
 Both Congress and the Department of Defense have recognized the threat posed 
by IED attacks. The DoD has been aware of the danger of these devices dating back to 
the start of the Iraqi insurgency in 2003, and Congress has allocated billions of dollars to 
various countermeasures through JIEDDO.29 The organization’s project budget is $3.465 
billion for FY2011, and in total, the Pentagon has invested over $20 billion developing 
technologies to address IEDs, ranging from basic tactics to the new, cutting-edge 
                                                
26 Mullah Mohammed Omar, Afghanistan Islamic Emirate: Rules and Regulations for 
Mujahidin (2009), 
<www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/obamaswar/etc/mullahomar.pdf>. 
27 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Afghanistan Mid-Year 
Report 2010, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Kabul: August 2010, 21. Oates, 
Foreign Press Center, 7. 
28 Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, Insurgent Abuses Against 
Afghan Civilians, December 2008, 4. 
29 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General, Marine Corps 
Implementation of the Urgent Universal Needs Process for Mine Resistant Ambush 
Protected Vehicles, December 8, 2008, Report No. D-2009-030, i  
<http://pogoarchives.org/m/ns/dod-ig-report-20081208c.pdf>. 
17 
technology.30 However, only a few of initiatives have produced results, leaving the US 
still struggling to find an effective countermeasure for these homemade devices. 
 Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) 
Table 1: Funding to the Joint IED Defeat Organization 
By fiscal year (in billions)  
Fiscal Year FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11   Total 
Funding $3.731 $4.39332 $3.55133 $3.134 $3.3835 $3.46536  $21.589 
 
Within its annual report, JIEDDO divides its initiatives into three broad categories 
— “defeat the device,” those that detect and disarm IEDs using new or existing 
technologies; “attack the network,” those that target the individuals and groups planting 
IEDs; and “train the force,” those that instruct soldiers on how to conduct counter-IED 
operations and operate equipment. 37 
 “Defeat the Device” 
                                                
30 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint IED Defeat Organization, “JIEDDO Fiscal Year 
2011 Budget,” press release, February 5, 2010,   
<https://www.jieddo.dod.mil/article.aspx?ID=854> (April 7, 2011). Rowan Scarborough, 
“Hunter lauds tactic to snuff IEDs,” Washington Times, September 16, 2010, 
<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/sep/16/lawmaker-lauds-tactic-to-snuff-
ieds-in-war-zones> (April 7, 2011). 
31 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Warfighter Support: Actions Needed to 
Improve Visibility and Coordination of DoD’s Counter-Improvised Explosive Device 
Efforts (2010), < www.gao.gov/new.items/d1095.pdf> (April 7, 2011). 
32 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint IED Defeat Organization, Annual Report FY 2007, 
17 
<https://www.jieddo.dod.mil/content/docs/2007_JIEDDO%2520Annual%2520Report_(
U).pdf> (April 7, 2011). 
33 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint IED Defeat Organization, Annual Report FY 2008, 
7 
<https://www.jieddo.dod.mil/content/docs/20090625_FULL_2008_Annual_Report_Uncl
assified_v4.pdf> (April 7, 2011). 
34 Joint IED Defeat Organization, Annual Report FY 2009, 13-17 
<https://www.jieddo.dod.mil/content/docs/20090909_FULL_2009%2520Annual%2520R
eport_Unclassified_v1_lr.pdf> (April 7, 2011). 
35 Joint IED Defeat Organization, press release, February 5, 2010. 
36 Joint IED Defeat Organization, press release, February 5, 2010. 
37 JIEDDO, Annual Report FY 2009, 11-15. 
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 JIEDDO has been unable to innovate efficient technologies to detect and disarm 
IEDs. The most sophisticated technologies developed by JIEDDO tend to locate 50 
percent of IEDs in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, despite five years and $9.4 billion 
worth of investments, bomb-sniffing dogs are still the most efficient method of detecting 
the devices, capable of locating 80 percent of IEDs when paired with trained handlers.38 
As a result Congress has heavily cut funding for IED detection, from $2.53B in 2007 to 
$1.973B in 2008 and $1.4B in 2009. Meanwhile, the military has continued to invest in 
IED-sniffing dogs. K2 Solutions Inc., a private contractor to the military, agreed last year 
to an $8.7 million contract with the Marine Corps to provide an additional 112 trained 
and certified dogs.39 Currently there are 300 of these IED-sniffing dogs deployed in 
Afghanistan, many of them operating under the IED detector dog program launched by 
the Marine Corps in 2007.40 
 Electronic “jammers,” designed to disrupt the frequencies of cell phone or radio 
waves that trigger IEDs, have become less effective over time. Most IEDs in Afghanistan 
initially used this type of trigger, and by employing jammers the military reduced radio-
                                                
38 Shaun Waterman, “General: K-9 Teams Find IEDs Better than $10 Billion Tech Gear,” 
Washington Times, October 20, 2010 
<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/oct/20/general-k-9-teams-find-ieds-better-
10-billion-tech/> (April 7, 2011). Sandra Erwin, “Technology Falls Short in the War 
Against IEDs,” National Defense Magazine, October 10, 2010, 
<http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=221> (April 7, 
2011). 
39Dan Lamothe, “Dogs Becoming Essential in Fight Against IEDs,” Marine Corps Times, 
March 25, 2010, 
<http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2010/03/marine_dogs_032510w/> (April 7, 
2011). 
40 Ali Sanders, “U.S. Troops Experience Downturn in IED Violence,” JIEDDO Public 
Affairs press release, February 3, 2011, 
<https://www.jieddo.dod.mil/content/docs/20110203_Downtrend_IED_story.pdf> (April 
7, 2011). 
19 
controlled IEDs to less than 10 percent of all explosive devices.41 The military also 
developed a way to operate jammers without disrupting its own equipment.42 However, 
insurgents responded by devising simpler IEDs that use pressure plate devices instead, 
ones that are immune to jammers. While the technology has been a success, the highest 
detection rates are still achieved using K-9 units.43 
 “Attack the Network” 
 The US military has also applied social network analysis to target insurgent 
groups planting IEDs. Rooted in the belief that a roadside bomb is not the work of a 
single individual, the process disrupts IED networks by identifying and targeting key 
individuals responsible for the bombs. The technique has been used both in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and is most notable for contributing to the capture of Saddam Hussein in 
December 2003.44 The military has long appreciated the need to study relationships, but 
computer modeling has helped produce conclusions more rapidly than experienced 
intelligence analysts.45 The military has also provided this type of expertise to its soldiers 
at the battalion and brigade level.46 
 “Train the Force” 
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 JIEDDO has invested $400 to $500 million per year in training soldiers to identify 
and search for IED explosives, most notably through the Joint Center of Excellence 
(JCOE).47 These skills are then tested through various simulations and training exercises 
to prepare soldiers for likely real-world scenarios. 
 Additional Countermeasures 
Beyond funding to JIEDDO, High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles 
(HMMWVs) are also one of the primary methods used to curb the death tolls of IED 
attacks. While the Department of Defense did not initially acquire funding for the safer 
Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected (MRAP) Vehicles, the DoD pushed for a rise 
HMMWV investment in FY2004. A significant investment in force protection equipment 
was one of the primary drivers behind the rise in war-related investment costs from 
FY2004 to FY2009. As a result, production of armored HMMWVs rose dramatically — 
from 15 per month in August 2003 to 450 per month in December 2004.48 These vehicles 
are still, however, vulnerable to EFPs.49 
 In response to rising death tolls the DoD launched another procurement initiative 
in 2007 to replace up-armored HMMWVs with MRAPs. MRAP funding tripled from 
$5.411 billion in FY2007 to $16.838 billion in FY2008. Used in limited numbers in Iraq 
and Afghanistan in 2003, the MRAPs were shown to provide “significantly more 
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protection against Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) than up-armored HMMWVs.”50 
DoD officials have explained that the casualty rate for an MRAP (6 percent) is less than 
half that of an M-1 Abrams battle tank (15 percent) and less than a third of an up-armored 
HMMWV (22 percent).51 These numbers have been reflected in IED incidents in 
Afghanistan. Between January and July 2007 the average IED attack on a Humvee killed 
an occupant 80 percent of the time, but that number drops to 15 percent among attacks on 
MRAP vehicles.52 
 However, the added security comes with certain tradeoffs. The armor provides 
better protection from typical roadside bombs, but the armor can still be penetrated with 
EFPs. As a result, military officials expect insurgents to increase their use of these more 
deadly devices.53 The weight added onto the Humvee also hinders the payload and 
performance of the vehicle.54 Added weight forces drivers to go slower, meaning that the 
vehicles are more protected from any individual IED but are more vulnerable to 
                                                
50 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Mine-Resistant, Ambush-
Protected (MRAP) Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress by Andrew Feickert, 
(Washington, DC: January 18, 2011). 
51 Geoff Morrell, “DoD News Briefing with Geoff Morrell,” press transcript, May 15, 
2008, <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4231> (April 7, 
2011). 
52 Tom Vanden Brook, “Armored trucks cut IED deaths among allied troops,” USA 
Today, September 7, 2010. Quoted in Andrew Feickert, 2 
<http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/2010-09-07-1Aafghan07_ST_N.htm> (April 7, 
2011). 
53 Tom Vanden Brook, “MRAPs can't stop newest weapon,” USA Today, May 31, 2007. 
Quoted in Andrew Feickert, 4 <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2007-05-31-
mrap-insurgents_N.htm> (April 7, 2011). 
54 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Improvised Explosive 
Devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan: Effects and Countermeasures by Clay Wilson  
(Washington, DC: August 28, 2007), 6. 
22 
command-detonated IEDs and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs).55 As a result, US forces 
are not currently using many older MRAPs in Afghanistan. As the Congressional 
Research Service questions, “if a large number of MRAPs are, in fact, not being used 
then a fundamental question is, why were they shipped to Afghanistan in the first 
place?”56 
The Afghan government has taken some its own steps to curb IED attacks. 
Afghan President Hamid Karzai issued a decree in January 2010 banning the importation, 
use, production, storage or sale of ammonium nitrate. 57 NATO estimates that less than 5 
percent of the nitrate fertilizer is used for a legitimate use, while the chemical is a major 
component in 80 to 90 percent of IED attacks.58 
 
Lack of Progress 
While some of these technologies have demonstrated results, none of them have 
been able to reverse the increasingly grim IED statistics. Between 2007 and 2009, the 
number of IED attacks in Afghanistan has tripled while deaths caused by IED attacks 
among US soldiers have quadrupled. 59 While larger numbers of IEDs may result in a 
larger number of deaths regardless of how effective US countermeasures may be, the 
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dramatic rise in IED incidents demonstrates that insurgents have not been deterred by US 
countermeasures. Most importantly, IED countermeasures have failed to positively 
change two of the most important statistics: the IED detection rate and the rate of 
“effective incidents” — those that injure or kill coalition forces.60 The rate of detection of 
IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan has held steady around 50 percent, despite billions of 
dollars worth of investment to improve it.61 The percentage of effective incidents is even 
worse. As a percentage of IED attacks, the number of effective incidents has increased 
over the last three years, from 7.7 percent in 2007 to 10.0 percent in 2008 and 2009 to 
10.8 percent through May 2010.62 Therefore, as of 2010 JIEDDO’s countermeasures have 
been unable to effectively address the problem of IEDs. 
 
A Development Solution: Roads 
Background 
Prior to the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, it was the Soviet Union that built 
much of Afghanistan's road network. The Soviets built roads during the 1960s and 1970s 
prior to the Soviet-Afghan war, including the ring road system linking Afghanistan’s 
major cities. Since that time, three decades of war have largely destroyed all road 
infrastructure in the country. By the late 1990s, the ring road was so destroyed that it 
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ceased to exist in many areas beyond a dirt track.63 While a few sporadic road 
improvements were made under the Taliban regime, the US Agency of International 
Development (USAID) estimated that Afghanistan had only about 50 kilometers of paved 
roads prior to 2001.64 
 
The Case for Roads 
In the absence of a panacea or silver bullet, several policymakers throughout the 
length of Afghan war have supported a less straightforward method to combat IEDs — 
building roads. Even JIEDDO has stressed the importance of non-technological ways to 
combat IEDs, highlighting the importance of political reconciliation.65 Under a 
counterinsurgency strategy, reconciliation starts with winning over the populous, which 
requires that the United States both demonstrate its long-term investment in 
Afghanistan’s future and present tangible benefits to locals. Roads fulfill those criteria, 
and several field researchers, theorists and policymakers contend that roads decrease the 
frequency of IED attacks. 
Among its supporters, roads are hailed as an effective solution for simultaneously 
addressing the logistical and systemic issues behind IED attacks — beginning with the 
pavement of the road itself. David Kilcullen, a former senior counterinsurgency adviser 
to General David Petraeus, suggests that the primary effect of road construction on IEDs 
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is derived from the pavement.66 Kilcullen argues insurgents are faced with a two options 
when attempting to place an IED along a paved road. Insurgents could dig through the 
hard surface, but this requires more time or a larger number of individuals than on an 
unpaved road, making it more likely the insurgents will be caught. Furthermore, the 
disturbance of the smooth pavement makes the IED easier for coalition forces to spot. 
Alternatively, insurgents can place the IED on the surface — either on the pavement or 
on the sides of the road. Coalition commanders spent considerable time considering this 
possibility, but ultimately concluded the devices would still be easier to spot than ones 
buried in the roadway, and therefore, they would still be better off with pavement than 
without it.67 Faced two less-than-ideal options, Kilcullen concludes that IED incidents 
should decline. 
 Road projects also provide incentive to locals to report the placement of IEDs. 
Road projects developed under Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) — government 
organizations that combine military and civilian reconstruction experts to work on 
reconstruction projects in volatile areas — initiate a series of negotiations with local 
tribal elders to construct portions of the road running through their territory. These elders 
then distribute jobs securing and constructing the road to their people, giving the 
populous a sense of ownership over the road. This is particularly the case with PRTs 
operating under a “10-kilometer rule,” which requires that 80 percent of unskilled labor 
come from within 10 kilometers of the project.68 Kilcullen contends that while IED 
attacks may rise in the short-term due to a road project, locals that value the project 
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respond to attacks by immediately repairing the road and providing intelligence on the 
insurgents they believe are responsible. As Lieutenant Colonel Chris Cavoli, a battalion 
commander for the PRT in Kunar province, remarked, “…the road helped us get the 
population to help us with IEDs…[t]here was one period, winter [2007], when we had 17 
IEDs…14 turned in by locals or found by our guards, 3 found by our Huskies…zero 
exploded.”69  
 The projects deprive insurgents of local support by connecting the population to 
the Afghan government. Before beginning construction, Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
reach out to district governors and local tribal elders to establish political institutions, or 
shuras. Enticed by the prospect of securing jobs and the power to consult on the project, 
elders come forward to participate in the shura.70 Road projects also generate disputes 
that government representatives can mediate, connecting themselves to the locals while 
raising their own status.71 Once built, the road also leads to traffic safety issues that can 
be managed by the Afghan government and used as an opportunity to create a habit of 
cooperation between the government and local tribes. Government officials, both on the 
provincial and national level, can also more easily and more frequently visit local leaders 
thanks to the dramatically reduced travel time. For instance, the road between Kabul and 
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Kandahar cut traveling time to a third.72 The drop in travel time also works in favor of 
Afghan forces.73 
 Finally, road projects provide economic incentives to locals. PRTs track the price 
insurgents offer individuals to attack roads or vehicles and ensure that they pay their road 
workers slightly more, eliminating any financial temptation for workers to plant IEDs or 
sabotage road construction projects. Beyond individual employment, decreased travel 
time, when combined when improved security, encourages the population in invest in 
crops because products are more likely to reach a market safe and unspoiled.74 USAID 
has stressed this particular point, identifying the improvement of roads to market centers 
as key indicator of the development of a licit economy in Afghanistan.75 US government 
officials have also used improved prosperity in one district to entice tribal elders in others 
into guaranteeing security. With local support, the military clears new areas, following up 
with reconstruction projects.76 
The Bush Administration, while not initially supportive of roads during the first 
year of the Afghan war, eventually reversed its stance. President Karzai’s initial attempts 
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to reconstruct the ring road around Afghanistan were turned down.77 Even USAID, the 
organization used today to manage most US-sponsored road construction in Afghanistan, 
initially declined to support the project, stating the organization “did not do road 
building.”78 During meetings in January and February 2002, Robert Finn, the first official 
American ambassador to Afghanistan in nearly 20 years, proposed investing in the 
Afghan ring road as a way to win the loyalty of locals.79 Finn has maintained this 
position, writing in 2007, “the more roads and infrastructure, the less the influence of the 
Taliban.”80 The Administration reversed course as President Bush pledged support for 
Afghan reconstruction, including road building, in a speech in April 2002.81 That pledge 
translated into $297 million in reconstruction funds, and by November 2002, the US 
agreed to build its first highway, connecting Kabul to Herat via Kandahar.82 
High-level policymakers — both in the military and the State Department — have 
bought into the connection between roads and security and have played a key role in 
acquiring funding for road building. Former Afghan Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann 
explains that while the US allocated some initial funding to road projects during the first 
few years of the war, that funding had flat-lined by 2006. The draft 2006 budget, unlike 
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the FY 2004 budget, would have significantly underfunded development by committing 
funds only to existing road projects.83 Hoping to significantly expand funding for road 
construction, Neumann developed a $600.9 million supplement with $223 million for 
roads.84 Facing significant resistance and the absence of a sense of urgency from 
Congress, Neumann explains that he won support for the project gradually through 
reports, conversations and individual meetings, as well as continuously stressing the 
connection between road building and security to key individual throughout the US 
government, starting with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Neumann and Lieutenant 
General Karl Eikenberry, then the Commander of the Combined Forces Command in 
Afghanistan, couched their funding requests in security rather than developmental terms 
as war deteriorated in 2006. “Where we opened roads security increased, the economy 
expanded, and it become harder for the insurgents to conceal bombs. We endlessly 
quoted Eikenberry’s statement, ‘Where the roads end, the insurgency begins.’”85 Military 
officials in Afghanistan have reiterated this claim, stating simply, “if you have a paved 
road here, you have fewer improvised explosive devices (IEDs).”86  
The support of policymakers for additional roads has translated into billions of 
dollars for construction projects. Along with managing the majority of overall US 
assistance to Afghanistan, USAID has handled the majority of funding for these 
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projects.87 Road construction has become a significant segment of the agency’s budget 
for Afghanistan, constituting 20 percent of USAID’s $5.9 billion in assistance as of 2008. 
By September of that year, USAID had constructed or rehabilitated over 1,650 miles of 
roads.88 Meanwhile, under the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), the 
Department of Defense has also allocated $300 million for civilian road projects, with an 
additional $260 million in roads for military purposes.89 
Table 2: USAID Funding for Afghanistan Reconstruction, by Program Category90 
By fiscal year (in millions) 
Program 
Category  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
2007 
request 
2008 
request Total 
Percent of 
Total 
Roads $51 $142 $354 $276 $255 $446 $338 $1,862 27 
 
 
Table 3: U.S. Government Funding Provided for Reconstruction, within Economic and social 
development91 
By fiscal year (in millions)  
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
Funding $124 $295 $855 $1,240 $706 $1,191 $1,491 $1,871 $7,776 
 
 Few experts have been critical of Kilcullen’s association of road building with 
decreases in IED attacks, but those that have argued that the association is positive, not 
negative. In short, road building increases IED attacks. As Joshua Foust, a fellow at the 
American Security Project, argues, discussion over road building largely omits how 
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insurgents can adapt to paved roads. Coalition forces and civilians are not the only groups 
that can take advantage of the new projects. Whether paved or unpaved, roads are still at 
a fixed location and can be used by anyone, and without constant patrols by US and 
coalition forces Taliban militants and other insurgent groups can lay down IEDs on the 
roads and quickly escape.92 During the Soviet-Afghan war, insurgents were able to use 
their mastery of the roads to prevent the consistent transport of supplies into Afghanistan, 
preventing the Soviets from supporting a larger force.93 As a result of reduced travel time, 
increased traffic along paved highways may also provide additional incentive to 
insurgents to target those roads. The level of violence along major paved highways adds 
weight to this claim. While roads are generally a target for insurgent attacks — with 85.9 
percent of all insurgent violence occurring near a road — John O’Loughlin finds that 
insurgent incidents within a five-kilometer buffer of the ring road are higher than 
coalition incidents, concluding that the ring road has become a disproportionately large 
target for IED attacks because it remains a major transport artery for government and 
allied forces.”94 The Kabul-Kandahar section of the ring road, a signature construction 
project built well before IEDs were common in Afghanistan, has been nicknamed the 
“highway to hell” and is commonly the sight of kidnappings and insurgent attacks. 
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Insurgents hold control of many sections of the road, even by day in certain areas.95 
Multiple news outlets have reported a Taliban resurgence along this road by 2007, 
claiming that insurgents control the road and many of the villages along it.96 Even smaller 
road projects off of Highway 1, such as the Tangi Valley road, are dubbed “IED alley.”97 
Back in May 2007, Brian Glyn Williams applied this same title to another paved road — 
the Kabul-Gardez highway — that was completed over a half year earlier in September 
2006.98 Despite paving thousands of kilometers of roads over the course of the war, 
military officials admitted in 2009 that it is more dangerous to travel by road in 
Afghanistan today than back under the Taliban.99 
 The risk associated with traveling on paved roads has limited the pace of 
development in Afghanistan. Taliban attacks make traveling on paved roads a less 
appealing option, limiting the effect the road project can contribute to improving the 
economy and underscoring the weakness of the Afghan central government.100 The 
danger along the roads has similarly limited the impact of NGOs. Many NGOs have 
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limited their movement, delayed or cut back projects and avoided the roads entirely. As 
Afghan Development Association Director Esmatullah Haidary explained, most 
foreigners avoid the roads by traveling by plane, and in southern Afghanistan, aid 
workers are largely limited to city centers for security purposes.101 By forcing aid 
workers to cut back on development projects, the violence ensures that the needs of the 
local population are less effectively met. 
 If road construction projects are a particular target for insurgents, one should 
expect the US government and its partners to consistently fail to meet targets for road 
construction. This is precisely what has happened, and contractors have explained that 
poor security conditions are primarily to blame.102 USAID failed to meet its targets for 
kilometers of road paved annually from 2006 to 2008. The Japanese government finally 
completed a 114-kilometer section of the Kandahar-Heart road in southern Afghanistan 
in July 2009, despite initially estimating that the section would be completed three years 
earlier.103 Security along the road from the Kajaki Dam to the ring road became so severe 
between 2007 and 2008 that the project was terminated despite of the fact USAID had 
already spent $5 million.104 
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Even if road projects improve security in the short-term, critics contend the 
Afghan government lacks the long-term resources to cover the costs of maintaining paved 
roads. No sustainable road maintenance program exists, and without funding, 
maintenance has been neglected.105 The Afghan Ministry of Public Works estimated in 
2007 that road maintenance would cost $30 million, yet the Ministry of Finance only 
allocated $8 million to the program, forcing the ministry workers to undertake only 
occasional maintenance. These costs are expected to rise as additional projects are 
completed. An estimate by Asian Development Bank pegs the annual cost of road 
maintenance between 2011 and 2015 to be $85 million to $90 million annually, excluding 
the costs of rural roads.106 Maintenance will be particularly necessary given the lesser 
quality of the material used to build the roads. The average cost of a paved road in 
Afghanistan is about $500,000 per kilometer, far below the $3 million to $6 million 
typically needed to build a road in the US, Europe or China. Matthew Nasuti, an expert 
on reconstruction, contends that number should be higher given the need to ship 
equipment, machinery and asphalt to Afghanistan, and cheap labor can only account for 
part of the difference.107 Nasuti concludes that USAID has prioritized the quantity of 
roads over quality, noting that the agency does not provide comprehensive data on the 
quality of the road materials. NGOs studying roads in Afghanistan have discovered 
similar quality issues. Integrity Watch Afghanistan, an NGO focused on improving 
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transparency and accountability, notes that on most district roads, “companies have used 
Double Basement Surface Treatment (DBST), whose life expectancy is not more than 3 
years.”108 According to the DoD, this type of road needs to be continuously treated — 
even in lightly trafficked areas — to maintain an acceptable level of service.109 USAID 
and international donors have agreed to temporarily fund road maintenance to protect 
new projects, but unless this funding continues Afghanistan will eventually be left with a 
crumbling road system, ensuring that neither the economic nor security benefits of roads 
are long lasting. 
 
The Scholarly Divide 
 Scholars have been equally divided on a deeper issue behind road construction — 
does remoteness (generally due to a lack of roads) help or inhibit a government from 
defeating an insurgency? 
 Certain civil war scholars have supported the broader claim made by Kilcullen, 
drawing a connection between roads and the power of a central state. Stated simply: 
paved roads sap the power of a potential insurgency by allowing a government to project 
its power out into more remote areas. As Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler contend, remote 
areas of terrain are most susceptible to an insurgency.110 Combined with low population 
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density, the sheer distance of these areas from the center of state power makes them hard 
to reach by government forces and therefore ideal for organizing a rebellion. Thus as 
James Fearon and David Laitin conclude, “the most important determinants of the 
prospects of an insurgency are most likely the police and military capabilities of the 
government, and the reach of government institutions into rural areas.”111 By building 
roads, and subsequently reducing the time needed to travel between two points, a central 
government can more easily penetrate remote areas and quell resistance. States 
throughout history have taken advantage of this fact to discipline terrain and expand their 
authority, particularly the Roman Empire. According to Logan Thompson, the Roman 
system of roads was developed because routes could not withstand the passage of large 
quantities of troops, particularly during inclement weather. Unpaved roads disintegrated 
into mud, seriously impeding the movement of troops, but by paving roads, armies could 
progress up to twenty-five miles a day toward areas of unrest. Noting that knowledge of 
this fact itself acted as a deterrent to the development of hostilities, Thompson concludes 
that roads were the primary reason for the military effectiveness of the Roman Empire.112 
Scholars investigating counterinsurgencies in the Philippines113, the Congo114, Malaya 
and Burma115 have all attributed increased mobility and economic development to the 
construction of infrastructure. 
 However, other civil war scholars contend that isolation acts as an inhibitor of 
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insurgent violence. More recent work by scholars suggests that areas with higher 
proportions of roads are more likely to face violent resistance. Halvard Buhaug and Jan 
Ketil Rød tested underlying determinants behind civil wars in Africa and found that, 
controlling for population, the density of roads is positively associated with the risk of 
civil war — contradicting their initial hypothesis. Separatist conflicts, Buhaug concludes, 
“occur in relatively more, not less developed regions.”116 Buhaug also concludes that 
mountainous and forested landscape — areas that weaker national governments cannot 
easily reach — also inhibits rebellion. In Afghanistan, locals have supported this strategy 
of isolation in the mountainous northeast province in Nuristan, opposing the construction 
of roads to keep foreigners out of the area.117 
These conclusions also match additional studies on Al-Qaeda’s efforts in Somalia. 
Clint Watts and Joe Felter suggest that one of the primary reasons the Al-Qaeda franchise 
struggled to take root in Somalia between 1992 and 1994 was that the expected low 
operational costs never materialized. Quoting from several uncovered letters between Al-
Qaeda members, Watts demonstrates that Al-Qaeda leaders discovered that transportation 
costs were “substantial and paralyzing for the Somali franchise.”118 Due in large part to 
poor infrastructure, shipping and transportation costs consumed their resources. “The 
very reasons that [Al-Qaeda] sought Somalia- an isolated safe haven for preparing and 
conducting terrorist operations- also made it nearly impossible to sustain operations.”119 
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In short, isolation and a lack of infrastructure can prevent a non-local insurgency from 
taking root. 
 
The Existing Evidence 
Field researchers interpreting data from provincial reconstruction teams in eastern 
Afghanistan support Kilcullen’s contention that roads reduce IED attacks and improve 
security. Noting that skeptics have criticized the lack of rigorous assessment of PRT 
projects, Carter Malkasian and Gerald Meyerle preface their support for PRTs by 
admitting, “There is no evidence that PRTs on their own have quelled violence.”120 
However, after conducting research for two months in 2007 and two months in 2008 
while working with four PRTs, Malkasian concludes that in at least three of the four 
provinces studied — Khost, Kunar and Ghazni — road projects had a positive impact on 
security. Of each PRTs spending among these three provinces, “30 to 60 percent went to 
roads and bridges.”121 In Khost, roads received the largest portion of a $22 million 
funding “blitz,” and within that province, Malkasian uses a Spearman’s Rank correlation 
to conclude that there is a statistically significant relationship between improvements in 
safety in individual districts and the level of PRT spending. In Kunar, Malkasian takes 
note of the drop in IED incidents along paved roads. IED incidents along the Jalalalabad-
Asadabad highway fell as the road was paved, dropping “from a high of 17 in 2006 to 7 
in 2007 following the road’s completion.”122 Like in Khost, Malkasian also explains that 
the road projects improved governance by increasing local political participation in 
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shuras. Malkasian argues that the same IED effect occurred along an additional PRT-
funded road constructed in the Pech River Valley, dropping from a high of 21 in the first 
6 months of 2006 (or 6 months before the start of the project) to 2 during the first 6 
months of 2008 (around March 2008 when the project was completed).123 In Ghazni, 
roads were paved in four of the five most dangerous districts. These five districts 
received the highest concentration of PRT funding, and as in Khost, Malkasian concludes 
that there is a statistically significant relationship between district security ratings and 
PRT spending.124 
 However, these statistics supporting the claims made by road advocates have not 
been rigorously analyzed. Malkasian concludes that PRTs “clearly…helped reduce 
violence and governance…[T]he strategy of out posting and road building brought 
security, revitalized local political institutions, and enabled the Afghan government to 
deliver goods and services to the people for the first time.”125 However, Malkasian’s 
analysis of individual roads in Kunar and Ghazni suffers from selection bias. To 
determine the association between road construction and the quantity of IED attacks, a 
study would need to contrast the quantity of attacks along paved roads against the 
quantity attacks along unpaved roads over the same time span. Malkasian’s work does 
not provide data for the latter, and without a comparable control group, his conclusions 
cannot be generalized to the rest of Afghanistan. Malkasian also demonstrates a 
statistically significant relationship between security ratings by district and PRT spending 
in Khost and Ghazni provinces, but only notes that the correlation is supported by “weak 
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statistical evidence” — or correlation at the .05 level — in the endnotes. Because PRT 
funding went to a variety of projects beyond roads, including the construction of schools, 
dams and wells, the effect road construction itself cannot be isolated. Furthermore, 
Malkasian also adds that the results for Kunar and Nuristan were not significant.126 
 Beyond Malkasian’s work, the influence of road projects on security has not been 
comprehensively analyzed. US agencies have not conducted sound evaluations to 
determine which projects have been most effective in achieving their goals, and in many 
cases, US agencies are not reporting complete information on civilian road projects to 
USAID.127 The few studies that have been conducted, such as the baseline studies for the 
Kabul-Kandahar and Kandahar-Heart roads, were completed after much of the work on 
the project was done, skewing any data the evaluations might mind.128 Like Kilcullen’s 
work, evidence supporting a connection between roads and improved security conditions 
is largely anecdotal, while updates on road construction by USAID are incomplete and 
are limited only to certain years.129 
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IV. Roads: Weapon or Target? 
The contradicting viewpoints among policymakers and theorists on the effect of 
roads beg the question: do roads impact the frequency of IED attacks in Afghanistan, and 
if so, is that impact positive or negative? The case studies examined in this thesis attempt 
to shed some light on that question. 
 
The Case Study 
Two pairs of roads are examined in this case study: the Kabul-Gardez and 
Gardez-Ghazni highways and the Lashkar Gah-Ring Road and Gereshk-Lashkar Gah 
highways (see appendix, figures 9 and 10). 
The decision to evaluate both pairs of highways was driven by several factors. 
First, both paved highways were started and completed during the earliest portion of the 
Afghan war logs between mid-2004 and late 2006. The Kabul-Gardez highway was 
completed between July 2004 and September 2006,130 while the Lashkar Gah-Ring Road 
highway completed between August 2005 and June 2006.131 The early completion dates 
create an opportunity to evaluate the effects of the road projects both during construction 
and three years after their completion. Given the low level of IED attacks in Afghanistan 
in 2004, both roads also begin with roughly the same number of IED attacks per 
kilometer. Second, both roads have comparable unpaved roads that can be used as a 
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control. In the first case study, both roads begin at the same provincial capital — Gardez 
— and lead to other provincial capitals, ensuring some level of comparability between the 
two cases. The same applies for the second pair of roads, where both begin in the 
provincial capital of Lashkar Gah and end along the ring road within Helmand province. 
Third, the research proves that neither of the control roads was paved during the time 
span of the war logs. The Gardez-Ghazni road opened for construction in September 
2010, nearly a year after the final entry in the war logs.132 Similarly, coalition forces did 
not start to pave the Gereshk-Lashkar Gah road, also known as “Route Trident,” until 
mid-December 2009.133 The initial 7.6 kilometers of paved road were completed in 
March 2010,134 and the extension, which will link up with existing roads to provide a 
continuous road between Lashkar Gah and Garesk, began in July 2010.135 
 
Data and Methodology 
I use a subset of a new dataset of insurgent and coalition incidents across 
Afghanistan for this case study, one assembled by the military and leaked by the website 
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WikiLeaks on July 25, 2010.136 Known commonly in the media as the Afghan war logs, 
the data contains tens of thousands of unique reports on the dates, geographic coordinates 
and casualties of insurgent and coalition incidents from the start of 2004 to the end of 
2009. The subset comes from the Guardian (UK), one of the three newspapers given 
access to the documents prior to their release. The datajournalism project conducted by 
investigative reporters at the Guardian includes only the 7,528 successful IED explosions 
listed in the WikiLeaks documents. As Simon Rodgers, a news editor for the Guardian, 
explains, the dataset “does not include person- or vehicle-borne suicide bombs… and 
only include[s] IED explosions [and] IED ambushes - where an explosion is combined 
with an ambush by insurgents.”137 
The documents certainly do not represent a complete picture of the Afghan war, 
but the documents are likely to correspond with other existing datasets in the case of 
IEDs. Given limited information about the insurgency, no reporting mechanism can 
account for all developments in Afghanistan in an entirely unbiased way. But as 
O’Loughlin notes, media sources takes note of violent events when they occur, and as 
such, other coders record and include these incidents in other datasets.138 
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ArcGIS 9 was used to narrow down the IED incidents.139 Both datasets were 
converted into shapefiles and compared to two shapefiles of the Afghan road network, 
both of which were necessary to acquire the proper data for all four roads.140 The file 
from the Geographic Information Support Team (GIST) included a key section of the 
Gardez-Ghazni highway between Ghazni, Dowlat Khan and the Zurmat district in Paktia 
province.141 The entire GIST road running from Gardez to Ghazni was also combined 
with a section of road running from Gardez to the Zurmat district from the USDMA file. 
The GIST file was also the only file that contained a road running through Gholam 
Dastagir Kalay, a city between Gereshk and Lashkar Gah in Helmand province that only 
Route Trident runs through. The remaining roads were taken from the USDMA shapefile. 
A one-kilometer buffer was placed over all four roads (see appendix, figure 11), and 
those IEDs falling within the boundaries were extracted from the dataset. 
I define the treatment as the point at which the road project was completed, even 
though portions of the road were constructed prior to its completion, because vehicles 
cannot take full advantage of a paved road in the middle of its construction. Generally 
portions of a road undergoing work are closed off to traffic, and it’s only once the project 
is completed that the freshly paved road becomes available for public use. 
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Thus, IED attacks that fell within the buffer were placed into two groups — those 
that occurred prior to the completion of the road and those that occurred after.142 I then 
calculated the average number of attacks in a year along all four roads for both pre- and 
post-treatment. To control for the varying lengths of the roads, I divided the average 
number of attacks in a year along all four roads by the respective length of each road (see 
appendix, tables 4 and 6). The lengths of the four roads are listed below: 
• Kabul-Gardez (Treatment 1, T1) — 125 kilometers143 
• Gardez-Ghazni (Control 2, C1) — 92 kilometers144 
• Lashkar Gah-Ring Road (Treatment 2, T2) — 49 kilometers145 
• Gereskh-Lashkar Gah (Control 2, C2) — 37 kilometers146 
 
Example: Kabul-Gardez Highway Post-Treatment, or T1B 
 
        59 IED attacks    =    17.7 attacks/year 
            3.33 years 
 
     17.7 attacks per year            0.1416 attacks per year 
    125 km       =                     km 
 
 To find the difference in differences (DID) between both pairs of roads, the pre-
treatment numbers were subtracted from the post- treatment numbers, minus the 
difference of the respective control road. 
                                                
142 Grouping the data into two groups also helped to eliminate year-to-year variations in 
IED attacks. IED incidents along the roads were initially grouped by year (see tables 10-
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144 Afghanistan Infrastructure and Rehabilitation Program, USAID, “A Road Runs 
Through It,” <https://www.irp-
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DID1 = (T1B–T1A) – (C1B–C1A) 
DID2 = (T2B–T2A) – (C2B–C2A) 
Limitations 
 As with all observational case studies, the conclusions I can draw from this 
research are limited and rely on a number of assumptions. I assume that the roads 
examined in this study, both paved and unpaved, are representative of roads generally in 
the southeast half of Afghanistan where IED attacks are most common. I examined two 
sets of roads in different regions of the country in an attempt to address part of this issue, 
but ultimately I cannot say with complete certainty that the roads examined accurately 
reflect all other roads in the region. The study is designed to account for the varying 
degrees in violence by province by studying roads branching out from a central location 
to similarly important areas (provincial capitals) as well as the likelihood that larger roads 
will suffer from a larger quantity of attacks. However, the case study design also cannot 
rule out the possibility that an omitted third variable has skewed the results. Thus, given 
the lack of total certainty that the relationship between paved roads and IED attacks is 
entirely independent, any relationship found between the two variables should be viewed 
with some degree of skepticism. 
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Evaluating the Results 
 
 
Figure 1. Case Study 1: Difference in attacks per kilometer before and after 
treatment. 
 
Table 4. 
Case Study 1.  Post‐Treatment  Pre‐Treatment  Differences 
Treatment 
(Kabul‐Gardez)  0.1416  0.03  0.1116 
Control 
(Gardez‐Ghazni)  0.136956522  0.028532609  0.108423913 
Difference  0.004643478  0.001467391   
Difference in Differences (DID1):  0.003176087  Percent Change:  216.44% 
 
As the graph demonstrates, the DID between the two roads is very small — just 
over .003. While road paving accounts for a 216.44 percent increase in IED attacks per 
year per kilometer when compared to the pre-treatment difference, the effect in terms of 
IEDs per year is small. Presuming that longer roads are no more likely to be target of IED 
attacks than shorter roads per kilometer, the road treatment increased IED attacks by .397 
per year (see table 5). 
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Table 5. 
Case Study 1.  Post‐Treatment  Pre‐Treatment  Differences  Post‐T IEDs/year 
Treatment 
(Kabul‐Gardez) 
0.1416  0.03  0.1116  17.7 
Untreated 
(Kabul‐Gardez) 
0.138423913  0.03  0.108423913  17.30298913 
Control 
(Gardez‐Ghazni) 
0.136956522  0.028532609  0.108423913    
       Effect:  0.397010875 
 
 
Figure 2. Case Study 2: Difference in attacks per kilometer before and after 
treatment 
 
Table 6. 
Case Study 2.  Post‐Treatment  Pre‐Treatment  Differences 
Treatment 
(Lashkar Gah‐Ring Road)  0.409302326  0.045977011  0.363325314 
Control 
(Gereshk‐Lashkar Gah)  0.445003143  0.022367195  0.422635948 
Difference  ‐0.035700817  0.023609816    
Difference in Differences (DID2):  ‐0.059310634  Percent Change:  ‐251.21% 
 
 The DID is small in the second case study as well (-.059), although there is 
greater variance in the pre- and post-treatment numbers. While the road paving accounts 
for a 251.21 percent decrease in IEDs per year per kilometer when compared to the pre-
49 
treatment difference, the effect in terms of IEDs, given the same assumptions as the first 
case study, is a decrease in IED attacks of 2.906 per year (see figure 3 and table 7).  
 
Figure 3. A representation of the trajectory of the road if otherwise left 
untreated. 
 
Table 7. 
Case Study 2.  Post‐Treatment  Pre‐Treatment  Differences  Post‐T IEDs/year 
Treatment  
Lashkar Gah‐Ring Road) 
0.409302326  0.045977011  0.363325314  20.05581397 
Untreated 
(Lashkar Gah‐Ring Road) 
0.468612959  0.045977011  0.422635948  22.96203499 
Control  
(Gereshk‐Lashkar Gah) 
0.445003143  0.022367195  0.422635948    
       Effect  ‐2.906221017 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V. Conclusion 
Despite the number of arguments presented by policymakers, field researchers 
and theorists about why paved roads should have an effect on IED attacks, either 
positively or negatively, the results of the two case studies suggest that there is little to no 
meaningful relationship between the two variables. Both DIDs were relatively small, and 
when converted into IED attacks per year neither case demonstrated a change of more 
than 3 IEDs per year. Presuming that the Department of Defense could find qualified 
contractors capable of handling the same contract as K-9 Solutions Inc. signed with the 
Marine Corps in 2010, the $49 million used to construct the Lashkar Gah-Ring Road 
highway in the second case study could have paid for well over 600 additional trained 
and certified bomb-sniffing dogs. As the most effective detection device currently 
available, nearing an 80 percent success rate (compared to 50 percent among other 
techniques), it is possible that hundreds of additional dogs could have met or surpassed 
this difference. When measured by the frequency of incidents, roads do not appear to be 
an effective tactic for addressing the problem of IEDs in Afghanistan. 
 This is not to suggest that there is no basis upon which to justify spending on road 
construction. It is possible that IEDs improve trade within Afghanistan and subsequently 
improve the economy, and testing alternative justifications for road construction is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. However, policymakers themselves have admitted that 
roads have been primarily sold to members of Congress and the bureaucracy in terms of 
security, not development. 
 Ultimately the results of this thesis suggest that the relationship between road 
building and the frequency of IED attacks merits greater study. Given the vast sum of 
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money spent combating IEDs — with hundreds of millions spent on road building and 
billions spent on research and development — the United States government should 
invest resources in more precisely and accurately measuring the effect of road building 
on IED attacks. Learning whether roads are a cost effective method of combating IEDs 
will help those in the policymaking world determine whether investments in road 
construction are worth the cost or whether those resources are better spent on more 
proven methods of IED detection and prevention. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 
Appendix 
 
Table 8. 
Treatment 
(Lashkar Gah‐Ring Road) 
IED Attacks  IEDs per year/km 
Pre‐Treatment  5  0.045977011 
Post‐Treatment  66  0.409302326 
Control 
(Gereshk‐Lashkar Gah) 
IED Attacks  IEDs per year/km 
Pre‐Treatment  2  0.022367195 
Post‐Treatment  59  0.445003143 
  
Table 9. 
Treatment 
(Kabul‐Gardez) 
IED Attacks  IEDs per year/km 
Pre‐Treatment  10  0.03 
Post‐Treatment  59  0.1416 
Control 
(Gardez‐Ghazni) 
IED Attacks  IEDs per year/km 
Pre‐Treatment  7  0.028532609 
Post‐Treatment  42  0.136956522 
   
Table 10. 
Kabul‐Gardez  Length: 125 km  Gardez‐Ghazni  Length: 92 km   
Year  IED Attacks  IED Attacks/Km  Year  IED Attacks  IED Attacks/Km 
2004  2  0.016  2004  3  0.032608696 
2005  5  0.04  2005  1  0.010869565 
2006  11  0.088  2006  4  0.043478261 
2007  17  0.136  2007  17  0.184782609 
2008  7  0.056  2008  11  0.119565217 
2009  27  0.216  2009  13  0.141304348 
Total  69    Total  49   
   
  Table 11. 
Lashkar Gah‐Ring Road  Length: 49 km  Gereshk‐Lashkar Gah  Length: 37 km   
Year  IED Attacks 
IED 
Attacks/Km  Year  IED Attacks 
IED 
Attacks/Km 
2004  1  0.020408163  2004  1  0.027027027 
2005  3  0.06122449  2005  1  0.027027027 
2006  7  0.142857143  2006  2  0.054054054 
2007  3  0.06122449  2007  4  0.108108108 
2008  24  0.489795918  2008  54  0.108108108 
2009  33  0.673469388  2009  49  1.324324324 
Total  71    Total  61 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Figure 4. Case Study 1: IED Incidents per year across both treatment and control  
roads. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 5. Case Study 2: IED incidents per year across both treatment and control  
roads. 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Figure 6.  A countrywide look at the location of IED in Afghanistan relative to  
 roads. 
 
 
 
55 
Figure 7. Test Case 1: A visual representation of IED attacks from 2004-2009 
along the treatment (Kabul-Gardez) highway in black and the control highway (Gardez-
Ghazni) in blue. The Kabul-Gardez road project was started in June 2004 and was 
completed in September 2006. 
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Figure 8. Test Case 2: A visual representation of IED attacks from 2004-2009 
along the treatment (Lashkar Gah-Ring Road) highway in black and the control highway 
(Gereshk-Lashkar Gah) in blue. The Laskhar Gah-Ring Road highway was started in 
August 2005 and was completed in June 2006. 
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Figure 9. A 1-kilometer buffer was placed over each of the four roads. IEDs 
located within the buffer were included in the dataset. 
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